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The New Science of Virtues
Abstract
Although Vico’s New	Science (NS) has been interpreted from the standpoint of practical 
philosophy, his treatment of moral virtues has largely been overlooked. I show the pivotal 
role they play in the NS, where the history of humankind is the story of how vices and virtues 
unfold, and the domain of free will is centred on the possibility of making virtues of the pas-
sions. This sheds new light on such notions as the “heterogony of ends”, the relationship 
between “bestioni” and humankind, and the threat of the “barbarism of reflection”. Also, 
it allows us to focus on fictional, mythological, and historical figures, which are exemplary 
for their virtues/vices and which provide an insight into the way virtues shape the stages 
of history. After presenting an overview of some of Vico’s sources, I argue that he engages 
in a close dialogue with the Aristotelian tradition and interprets moral virtues as a histori-
cal framework and a hermeneutical tool suitable for assessing the moral stages of human 
historical evolution on the route to and from civilisation.
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1. “Making virtues of passions”
In	this	paper,1	I	focus	on	Vico’s	account	of	the	virtues	in	order	to	show	that	
it	is	possible	to	consider	the	New Science2	from	the	point	of	view	of	a	theory	
of	the	virtues,	that	is,	a	genealogy	of	virtues	and	an	account	of	evolutionary	
virtue	ethics.	When	Vico	presents	the	“Principal	aspects	of	this	science”,	in	
the	beginning	of	the	second	book,	among	the	different	perspectives	which,	ac-
1
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2
In	general,	all	quotations	 refer	 to	NS44	and,	
when	they	refer	instead	to	NS25,	this	is	clear-
ly	stated;	in	both	cases	passages	are	indicated	
by	the	number	of	paragraph.	NS44	is	quoted	
in	the	Bergin-Fisch	translation:	G.	Vico,	The 
New Science,	 unabridged	 translation	 of	 the	
third	edition	(1744),	with	the	addition	of	the	
“Practic	of	the	New	Science”,	transl.	by	T.	G.	
Bergin	 and	M.	H.	 Fisch,	 Cornell	University	
Press,	 Ithaca	 –	 London	 1984.	 Occasionally,	
to	provide	another	 translation	of	particularly	
thorny	passages,	the	Marsh	translation	is	used:	
G.	Vico,	New Science,	third	edition,	transl.	by	
D.	Marsh,	with	an	introduction	by	A.	Grafton,	
Penguin,	London	1999.	NS25	is	quoted	in	the	
Pompa	translation:	G.	Vico,	The First New Sci-
ence,	ed.	and	transl.	by	L.	Pompa,	Cambridge	
University	 Press,	 Cambridge	 2002.	 NS30	 is	
refered	to	by	page	number	from	the	Cristofo-
lini	edition:	G.	Vico,	La Scienza nuova 1730,	
ed.	P.	Cristofolini,	ass.	ed.	M.	Sanna,	Alfredo	
Guida,	Napoli	2004.	References	to	the	Italian	
original	terms	used	by	Vico	are	provided	from	
the	Battistini	edition:	G.	Vico,	Opere,	ed.	A.	
Battistini,	2	vols.,	Mondadori,	Milano	1990.
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cording	to	him,	can	(and	should)	be	applied	to	the	interpretation	of	his	work,	
he	could	well	have	added	that	the	NS offers	a	historically	developed	interpre-
tation	of	the	Aristotelian	theory	of	virtues.	I	do	not	necessarily	mean	that	this	
is	the	way	Vico	wanted	his	text	to	be	read,	as	the	theory	of	virtue	would	have	
seemed	very	much	a	platitude	to	him.	Instead,	I	wish	to	show	that	some	of	the	
conceptual,	as	well	as	lexical,	choices	made	by	Vico	can	be	better	understood	
if	we	bear	in	mind	the	widely	debated	tradition	of	moral	virtues.
Dealing	with	the	“second	principal	aspect	of	this	science”,	which	is	a	“phi-
losophy	of	authority”,	he	makes	it	clear	that:	“the	property	of	human	nature	
which	not	even	God	can	take	from	man	without	destroying	him	(…)	is	the	
free	use	of	the	will”	(§	388–389).	This	is	connected	to	Axiom	VIII:	that	“man	
has	free	choice	(libero arbitrio),	however	weak,	to	make	virtues	of	his	pas-
sions”	(§	136).	How	this	historical	transformation	and	civil	evolution	of	the	
passions	into	virtues	is	achieved,	and	in	what	ways	it	brings	about	the	whole	
course	 of	 history,	 is	 the	 object	 of	 the	 reading	which	 I	 propose.	 From	 this	
standpoint,	making	the	virtues	the	focus	of	our	attention	is	relevant	to	devel-
oping	a	new	insight	into	Vico’s	work	and	to	seeing	how	he	deals	with	the	long	
philosophical	tradition	of	moral	virtues	and	Aristotelian	ethics.	It	might	also	
help	to	counteract	a	widespread	historiographical	(mis)judgement	typical	of	
the	analytical	history	of	ethics:	the	view	that	philosophical	reflection	about	
virtues	and	virtue	ethics	moves	from	Aristotle	and	Thomas	Aquinas	to	Hume,	
placing	everything	in	between	into	a	black	hole	of	irrelevance.3
A	preliminary	objection	needs	to	be	confronted:	is	a	“Vichian	account	of	the	
virtues”	to	be	found	in	the	NS after	all?	Vico	does	not	devote	a	specific	section	
to	a	treatment	of	the	virtues,	and	one	would	be	hard	put	to	track	down	a	system-
atic	approach	to	the	virtues	in	his	works.	Instead,	he	provides	multiple	clues	to	
different	accounts	of	the	virtues	throughout	his	work	and	draws	on	complex,	
intertwined,	and	multi-faceted	philosophical	traditions	which,	however,	seem	
to	have	generally	escaped	the	attention	of	scholars.	Although	a	good	deal	has	
been	written	about	his	treatment	of	prudence	or	of	his	heroes	and	their	heroic	
virtue,	no	comprehensive	analysis	of	moral	virtues	in	the	NS	seems	as	yet	to	
have	been	attempted.	This	 is	not	 the	place	 to	 investigate	any	specific	virtue	
at	length;	instead,	I	aim	to	focus	on	the	way	different	philosophical	traditions	
about	moral	virtues	crop	up	in	Vico’s	work.	A	preliminary	account	of	some	
of	these	various	influences,	based	on	a	few	passages	in	the	NS,	will	guide	us	
through	Vico’s	treatment	of	the	notion	of	virtue.	This	notion	should	not	only	
take	into	account	references	to	the	virtues	and	to	their	definitions,	but	should	
also	strive	for	a	broader	outlook,	in	which	their	correlated	vices	are	considered.	
There	are	many	reasons	for	this:	1.	Vico	often	juxtaposes	virtues	with	vices	and	
bases	their	theoretical	polarity	on	historical	considerations;	2.	in	doing	so,	he	
seems	to	be	influenced,	at	least	to	some	extent,	by	the	Aristotelian	tradition	with	
regard	to	the	definitions	of	virtues	and	vices;	3.	however,	the	connection	which	
Vico	highlights	between	vice	and	virtue	is	not	just	an	opposition	or	polarization	
in	line	with	the	Aristotelian	tradition.	He	also	connects	virtues	to	vices;	and	in	
many	instances	their	interconnections	are	spread	along	the	continuous	curve	of	
ideal	eternal	history,	as	virtues	and	vices	evolve	and	resolve	into	one	another,	
with	the	heterogony	of	ends	playing	a	key	role	in	this	passage.
2. At the root of virtues: Homer and Achilles
It	comes	as	no	surprise	that	in	his	research	Vico	does	not	start	directly	from	
the	philosopher	who	we	nowadays	consider	the	father	of	virtue	ethics,	Aris-
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totle.	And	this	is	not	because	he	explicitly	states	in	his	Autobiography	that	he	
prefers	Plato	to	Aristotle	–	a	judgement	which	should	be	put	under	close	scru-
tiny	and	called	into	question,	or	at	least	treated	with	some	caution.4	Rather,	in	
this	instance,	Aristotle’s	moral	philosophy	cannot	provide	the	point	of	depar-
ture	for	a	theory	of	virtues	because	in	Vico’s	view	he	represents	a	mature	stage	
of	philosophical	reflection,	which	he	refers	to	as	a	stage	of	“fully	developed	
human	 reason”	 (§	326,	924).	For	 the	very	 same	 reason,	Plato’s	account	of	
virtues	also	cannot	help	Vico,	who	is	looking	for	the	origins	of	human	moral	
virtue.	Therefore,	moving	along	a	regressive	path	in	order	to	find	the	root	of	
the	virtues,	Vico	reaches	an	archaic	poet,	rather	than	a	philosopher	–	Homer,	
rather	than	Plato.
A	passage	from	NS25	explains	the	reasons	underlying	this	choice	and	its	im-
plications,	both	philological	and	philosophical:	“whilst	Plato	was	taking	his	
notions	from	Homer,	Homer	has	been	read	as	if	he	had	been	a	philosopher	like	
Plato”.5	Vico	openly	criticises	such	an	unhistorical	interpretation	of	Homer’s	
poems;	but	his	main	reason	for	addressing	this	issue	is	to	provide	a	compari-
son	between	the	philosophers’	notion	of	heroic	virtue	and	the	poets’	notion	of	
the	hero	and	his	virtue.	This	passage,	with	its	hapax legomenon	(omerizzò),	
lacks	a	correlative	in	the	later	versions	of	NS;6	Vico’s	“Discovery	of	the	true	
Homer”	is	yet	to	come,	so	this	can	only	be	seen	as	a	hint	at	the	philological	
issues	which	will	find	a	more	comprehensive	solution	there;7	and	yet	this	pas-
sage	shows	the	distance,	as	well	as	the	connection,	between	the	hero	of	the	
poets	and	the	hero	of	the	philosophers.
The	difference	between	 them	is	 the	notion	of	virtue	which	 they	embodied.	
The	poets	attributed	virtue	to	the	supposedly	divine	nature	of	the	hero,	a	con-
cept	which	was	later	reinforced	by	metaphysics:
“the	hero	of	the	poets	was	believed	to	be	of	divine	origin	because	he	had	been	born	under	Jupi-
ter’s	spells,	and	this	is	how	the	poets’	hero,	by	meditation	and	philosophical	explanation	became	
the	philosophers’	hero:	that	he	was	the	one	who,	by	meditating	on	the	eternal	truths	taught	by	
metaphysics,	he	actually	could	become	of	a	divine	nature,	and	because	of	that,	he	naturally	acted	
moved	by	virtues”	(NS25,	§	301).
It	seems	here	that,	properly	speaking,	moral	virtues	are	only	to	be	found	at	
a	later	stage	in	history,	as	well	as	in	history	of	philosophy;	and	yet	the	Ho-
3
See,	 for	 instance,	S.	M.	Gardiner	ed.,	Virtue 
Ethics, Old and New,	 Cornell	 University	
Press,	Ithaca	–	London	2005,	p.	1.
4
There	is	little	doubt,	for	instance,	that	Vico’s	
division	of	moral,	economic	and	civil	virtues	
is	modelled	 on	 the	Renaissance	Aristotelian	
tradition	 of	moral	 philosophy,	which	 distin-
guished	 between	 ethics,	 oeconomics	 and	
politics,	 see	 J.	 Kraye,	 “Moral	 philosophy”,	
in:	gen.	ed.	C.	B.	Schmitt,	eds.	Q.	Skinner,	E.	
Kessler,	ass.	ed.	J.	Kraye,	Cambridge History 
of Renaissance Philosophy,	Cambridge	Uni-
versity	Press,	Cambridge	1988,	pp.	303–386,	
in	particular	at	pp.	303–305.	Generally	speak-
ing,	and	from	a	quantitative	perspective,	com-
pared	to	NS25,	NS44	contains	a	larger	number	
of	references	to	both	Plato	and	Aristotle,	but	
while	 the	 number	 of	 references	 to	 Plato	 in-
creases	only	moderately,	there	are	more	than	
five	times	as	many	to	Aristotle.
5
NS25,	§	302	(“onde	Platone	omerizzò,	Omero	
fu	creduto	platonizzare”).
6
For	 a	 synoptic	 analysis	 of	 the	 different	 ver-
sions	of	NS	book	III	about	Homer	in	the	1730	
and	in	the	1744	edition	see,	G.	Vico,	La dis-
coverta del vero Omero,	seguita	dal	Giudizio 
sopra Dante,	 ed.	 P.	 Cristofolini,	 ETS,	 Pisa	
2006.
7
The	criticism	aimed	at	the	notion	of	Homer	as	
a	philosopher	anticipates	the	Vichian	solution	
of	 the	Homeric	question,	 see	P.	Cristofolini,	
“Prefazione”,	 in	 G.	Vico,	La discoverta del 
vero Omero,	pp.	5–19.
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meric	 legacy8	 is	 the	 point	 of	 departure,	 since	Plato	 drew	his	 notions	 from	
Homer,	and	Vico	was	looking	for	the	nature	of	things	by	tracing	them	back	
to	their	origins.9	This	explains	why	he	investigates	what	sort	of	virtue	can	be	
attributed	to	the	hero	of	the	poets,	as	that	must	be	the	source	of	a	primeval,	
fundamental	virtue.	This	Ur-Tugend,	first	appearing	as	a	trait	belonging	to	the	
heroes	in	Homer’s	Iliad,	was	the	basic	(and	even	base)	element	of	an	as	yet	
unrecognized,	and	barely	recognizable,	moral	life.
That	the	Homeric	poems	provide	the	first	account	of	ethics	and	can	be	con-
sidered	the	original	source	of	the	customs	and	virtues	which	have	shaped	the	
Western	tradition	was	obvious	to	Vico;	and,	remarkably,	“recent	decades	have	
seen	a	great	deal	of	fascinating	and	suggestive	scholarly	work	on	the	ethics	
of	the	Homeric	poems”.10	Although	the	educational	value	of	Homer’s	poems	
was	widely	recognized	by	ancient	authors,11	nowadays	this	view	is	less	com-
mon;	and	in	The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics,	which	opens	with	
an	introductory	chapter	devoted	to	“Homeric	Ethics”,	Roger	Crisp	feels	the	
need	to	justify	this	subject.12	Crisp	does	not	refer	to	Vico,	who,	nevertheless,	
seems	to	strike	a	balance	between	a	developmental,	progressivist	view,	as	put	
forward	by	Bruno	Snell,	which	considers	the	Homeric	poems	as	portraying	
a	 ‘primitive’	 account	 of	morality,	 and	 a	 regressivist	 account,	 as	 developed	
by	Bernard	Williams.	The	latter	perspective	will	become	clear	in	§	7	below,	
while	here	I	will	consider	the	former.
When	considering	Vico’s	progressive	view	in	relation	to	the	moral	virtues,	we	
are	bound	to	notice	that	in	providing	his	account	of	a	genealogy	of	virtues,	
Vico	first	of	all	goes	back	to	Homer’s	poems;	and	what	he	finds	there	is	in-
deed	so	far	from	the	philosophical	and	ethical	notion	of	virtue	that	it	supports	
his	belief	that	it	is	a	trustworthy	and	truthful	exposition	of	the	typical	char-
acteristics	of	the	heroic	nature.	These	are	described	as	“crude,	course,	wild,	
savage,	volatile,	unreasonable	or	unreasonably	obstinate,	frivolous,	and	fool-
ish”.13	Previously	he	had	remarked	that	the	Iliad	is	filled	with	“bloody	bat-
tles,	so	many	and	such	extravagantly	cruel	kinds	of	butchery”,	and	that	most	
comparisons	are	drawn	“from	beasts	and	other	savage	 things”	and	coupled	
with	a	“truculent	and	savage	style”	(§	785).	The	“blind	rage	(cieca collera)”,	
the	“bestial	wrath	 (collera bestiale)”	and	 the	“gods	and	heroes	of	 such	 in-
stability”	(§	786)	far	exceed	(or	rather:	precede)	any	trace	of	humanity	and	
civility,	so	that	the	wisdom	of	philosophers	could	not	have	imagined	them.	If	
we	consider	the	Aristotelian	account	of	virtues	and	vices	in	the Nicomachean 
Ethics,	 it	 appears	 that	 in	Homer	we	 are	 confronted	with	 something	which	
more	closely	resembles	a	list	of	vices	than	a	catalogue	of	virtues:	irascibility,	
rashness,	meanness,	rusticity,	conceit,	and	vulgarity,	as	opposed	to	good	tem-
per,	self-restraint,	truthfulness,	urbanity,	liberality,	and	greatness	of	soul.
Aristotle	had	written	that	“the	conceited	sort	(…)	are	foolish,	and	ignorant	of	
themselves”,14	and	Vico	expands	 this	notion:	 they	are	foolish	because	 they	
came	early	in	historical	development	and	therefore	their	immaturity	resem-
bles	that	of	small	children	(a	concept	made	sufficiently	clear	by	Francis	Ba-
con15).	In	a	way,	it	looks	like	the	transformation	of	passions	and	vices	into	
virtues	might	 just	be	a	matter	of	opus temporis.	And	if	we	compare	Vico’s	
long	lists	of	the	vices	of	the	first	men	with	the	theory	of	virtues	and	vices	in	
Aristotelian	ethics,	many	correspondences	become	evident,	making	the	Iliad	
look	like	a	complete	catalogue	of	moral	vices:	haughtiness,	presumption,	hos-
tility,	 pettiness,	 naivety,	 insensitivity,	 hardness	 of	 heart	 are	 all	 to	 be	 found	
there.	Achilles	is	the	archetypal	example	of	the	traits	of	the	Homeric	hero,	and	
Vico	presents	him	as
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“…	forgetting	the	sacred	laws	of	hospitality,	unmindful	of	the	simple	faith	in	which	Priam	has	
come	all	alone	to	him	(…)	unmoved	by	the	many	great	misfortunes	of	such	a	king	or	by	pity	
for	such	a	father	or	by	the	veneration	due	to	so	old	a	man,	heedless	of	the	common	lot	(fortuna 
comune)	which	avails	more	than	anything	else	to	arouse	compassion”.16
So	what	sort	of	virtue	does	Achilles	possess?	It	seems	legitimate	to	doubt	that	
it	can	be	regarded	as	a	virtue	at	all,	Vico	argues.
And	 yet,	 he	 provides	 an	 interpretation	 of	Achilles’	 qualities	 which	 relies	
heavily	on	the	epithet	“blameless”:	“This	is	the	hero	that	Homer	sings	of	to	
the	Greek	peoples	as	an	example	of	heroic	virtue	and	to	whom	he	gives	the	
fixed	epithet	‘blameless’	(irreprensibile)!”.17	This	epithet	(amumon)	deserves	
closer	attention:	Nicolini18	remarks	that	Vico	here	is	transferring	to	the	moral	
8
See	K.	Mueller-Vollmer,	“Vom	wahren	Homer	
und	vom	historischen	Abstand.	Gedanken	zu	
Vicos	wilder	Hermeneutik”,	in:	K.	K.	Polheim	
ed., Sinn und Symbol,	Peter	Lang,	Bern	1987,	
pp.	45–64;	A.	Grafton,	“Introduction”,	in:	G.	
Vico,	New Science,	 pp.	XI–XXXIII;	L.	Fer-
reri,	La questione omerica dal Cinquecento 
al Settecento,	Edizioni	di	Storia	e	Letteratura,	
Rome	2007.
9
See	 the	 famous	Axiom	XIV:	“The	nature	of	
institutions	 is	 nothing	 but	 their	 coming	 into	
being	 (nascimento)	 at	 certain	 times	 and	 in	
certain	guises”	(NS44,	§	147);	“The	nature	of	
an	institution	is	identical	with	its	nascence	at	
a	certain	time	and	in	a	certain	manner”	(trans.	
Marsh).
10
R.	Crisp,	“Homeric	Ethics”,	 in	R.	Crisp	ed.,	
The Oxford Handbook of the History of Eth-
ics,	 Oxford	 University	 Press,	 Oxford	 2013,	
pp.	 1–20,	 here	 p.	 17.	 See	 also	 D.	 Cairns,	
Aidōs: The Psychology and Ethics of Hon-
our and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature,	
Clarendon	Press,	Oxford	 1993;	T.	H.	 Irwin,	
Classical Thought,	Oxford	University	Press,	
Oxford	1989;	A.	A.	Long,	“Morals	and	Val-
ues	in	Homer”,	Journal of Hellenic Studies	90	
(1970),	pp.	121–139;	A.	MacIntyre,	A Short 
History of Ethics,	 Macmillan,	 New	 York	
1966;	R.	Sharples,	“’But	Why	Has	My	Spirit	
Spoken	with	Me	Thus?’:	Homeric	Decision-
Making”,	Greece and Rome	 30	 (1983),	 pp.	
1–7;	B.	Williams, Shame and Necessity,	Uni-
versity	 of	 California	 Press,	 Berkeley	 20082	
(1993);	 N.	 Yamagata,	 Homeric Morality,	
Brill,	Leiden	1994.
11
R.	Crisp,	“Homeric	Ethics”, “the	poems	were	
an	educational	staple”	(p.	1):	see,	for	instance,	
Plutarch’s	Life of Alexander,	8.
12
R.	 Crisp,	 “Homeric	 Ethics”,	 pp.	 1–2:	 “The	
other	 chapters	 in	 this	 Handbook	 mostly	
concern	 philosophers,	 their	 views,	 and	 their	
works.	 So	 why	 begin	 with	 a	 chapter	 on	 a	
couple	 of	 poems?	One	 reason	 is	 the	 central	
importance	 of	 the	 poems	 in	 the	 history	 of	
philosophy,	 and	 hence	 of	 philosophical	 eth-
ics”.	 Among	 the	 other	 reasons	 given	 here,	
the	problems	of	interpretation	and	translation	
play	a	central	 role.	They	 raise	“issues	about	
the	nature	of	morality	 itself,	 the	human	 self	
and	 agency,	 responsibility,	 shame	 and	 other	
moral	emotions,	and	the	nature	of	 the	virtue	
in	 general,	 and	 of	 particular	 virtues	 such	 as	
courage	and	compassion”	(p.	2).	Crisp	urges	
that	“it	is	vital,	then,	in	seeking	to	answer	the	
questions	raised	in	philosophical	ethics	not	to	
restrict	 one’s	 reading	 to	 works	 traditionally	
categorized	as	‘philosophical’	(…)	there	is	in	
Homer	a	view	of	the	nature	of	human	beings	
and	their	place	in	the	world,	and	their	reasons	
for	living	and	acting	in	that	world”	(ibid.).
13
NS44,	§	787	(“rozzi,	villani,	feroci,	fieri,	mo-
bili,	 irragionevoli	 o	 irragionevolmente	 osti-
nati,	leggieri	e	schiocchi”).
14
Aristotle,	Nicomachean Ethics,	1125a27.
15
See,	for	instance,	F.	Bacon,	Cogitata et visa,	13.
16
§	786.	See	Cicero,	Pro Quinctio,	97	for	a	pas-
sage	dealing	with	compassion	(misericordia)	
and	bearing	a	close	affinity	to	this	passage	of	
Vico,	both	in	content	and	in	structure.
17
§	 667	 (“Omero	 con	 l’aggiunto	 perpetuo	
d’irreprensibile	canta	a’	greci	popoli	in	esem-
plo	 d’eroica	 virtù”).	 Both	 Bergin-Fisch	 and	
Marsh	 translate	 “blameless”;	 Pompa	 recurs	
to	 “irreproachable”	 (NS25,	 §	 52),	 however	
“blameless”	has	been	for	a	long	time	the	cus-
tomary	translation	in	the Iliad.
18
F.	Nicolini,	Commento storico alla seconda 
scienza nuova,	Edizioni	di	Storia	e	Lettertura,	
Roma	1949–1950,	II	vol.,	p.	296:	the	epithet	
“hints	 only	 at	 the	 position	 held	 by	 birth,	 at	
physical	 beauty	 and	 heroic	 courage,	 not	 at	
moral	qualities,	as	Vico	seems	to	believe”.
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field	features	originally	intended	by	Homer	to	indicate	such	exterior	aspects	
as	“being	properly	clad”.	Vico	himself	comes	up	with	his	own	explanation	as	
to	what	the	epithet	means.	Before	discussing	this,	however,	it	is	worth	noting	
that	his	translation	of	the	epithet	as	irreprensibile	helps	us	to	identify	the	ver-
sion	of	Homer’s	Iliad	which	Vico	was	reading.19	A	survey	of	the	translations	
available	in	Naples	during	his	lifetime,	limited	to	the	Biblioteca	Brancaccia-
na’s	holdings	as	recorded	in	the	catalogue	printed	in	1750,20	shows	that	the	
edition	of	the	Iliad	to	which	Vico	referred	was	almost	certainly	the	annotated	
edition21	by	Hubert	van	Giffen,	printed	in	Strasbourg	in	1572,	containing	the	
Greek	text	(1566)	by	Henri	Estienne	and	the	Latin	translation	(1559)	by	Jean	
Crespin.	This	appears	 to	be	 the	only	one	 to	use,	 twice,	 irreprehensibilis	as	
the	epithet	for	Achilles.22	This	hypothesis	will	need	further	investigation,	of	
course,	as	Vico	no	doubt	consulted	more	than	one	Iliad translation;	however,	
this	edition	looks	like	the	version	he	might	have	used	for	reference.23
The	attempt	to	solve	the	riddle	of	why	Achilles	is	described	as	“blameless”	
has	a	long	history,	with	many	scholars	offering	tentative	explanations,24	rang-
ing	from	the	ornamental	to	the	formulaic	(and	therefore	unrelated	to	the	con-
text)	to	the	irrational25	use	of	epithets	by	Homer.	In	a	book	entirely	devoted	
to	investigating	this	specific	epithet,	Anne	Amory	Parry	analysed	its	116	oc-
currences	in	both	Homeric	poems,	considering	their	context	as	well	as	whom	
they	designated.	While	she	concludes	that	translating	it	as	“blameless”	does	
not	make	sense	 in	any	of	 these	occurrences,	she	nevertheless	demonstrates	
that	the	epithet
“…	denotes	primarily	the	kind	of	beauty	possessed	by	a	young,	strong,	and	active	man,	it	might	
by	an	easy	extension	come	to	mean	‘like	a	warrior’	in	respect	to	any	quality	which	was	allied	
with	or	dependent	on	a	strong,	handsome	body.	Amumon	therefore	may	possess	the	connotations	
of	‘brave’,	‘spirited’,	‘steadfast	in	battle’	and	so	on	(…)	if	English	had	an	adjective	that	meant	
‘possessing	the	strong,	handsome	body	of	a	warrior’	that	adjective	could	be	used	satisfactorily	
in	the	majority	of	the	passages”.26
Unsurprisingly,	Vico’s	explanation	of	this	epithet	differs	from	Amory’s;	but	
both	share	a	similar	sense	of	the	inappropriateness	of	the	translation	‘blame-
less’,	as	well	as	an	awareness	that	the	interpretation	of	this	epithet	is	the	key	to	
bridging	the	gap	between	Homer’s	archaic	culture	and	our	own	civilization.
The	difficulty	of	making	sense	of	this	epithet	and	of	its	translation	had	been	
apparent	to	Vico	since	NS25	(§	52),	where	he	did	not	provide	a	convincing	
explanation.	Achilles’	 exemplary	 role	 in	 the	 Iliad	 as	 a	 hero	 endowed	with	
heroic	virtue	puzzled	Vico,	since	he	could	not	help	noticing	that	Achilles	con-
nected	his	notion	of	what	was	right	to	his	own	strength	and	failed	to	recognize	
any	divine	authority	or	superiority	in	Apollo,	just	as	any	Polyphemus	would	
do,	except	that	no	one	would	consider	him	a	model	of	heroic	virtue.	In	NS30	
Vico’s	ironical	attitude	is	signalled	by	his	use	of	an	exclamation	mark;27	and	
Cristofolini’s	edition	shows	in	its	critical	apparatus	the	wealth	of	annotation	
and	marginalia	crowding	around	this	passage28	between	1730	and	1744.	Only	
in	NS44	did	Vico	produce	his	own	explanation	 in	a	newly	written	passage	
interpolated	in	the	previous	text	of	NS30.	Here	Vico	assumes	that	“blameless”	
(irreprensibile)	 serves	 the	 purpose	 of	 indicating	 that	Achilles	was	 a	 proud	
man:
“This	epithet	(…)	can	be	understood	only	as	meaning	a	man	so	arrogant	(un uomo orgoglioso)	
that,	as	we	would	say	nowadays,	he	will	not	let	a	fly	pass	the	end	of	his	nose.	What	he	<Homer>	
preaches	is	thus	the	virtue	of	punctiliousness,	on	which	the	duelists	of	the	returned	barbarian	
times	based	their	entire	morality,	and	which	gave	rise	to	the	proud	laws	(leggi superbe),	the	lofty	
duties	(ufizj altieri)	and	the	vindictive	satisfactions	of	the	knight	errant	of	whom	the	romancers	
sing”.29
SYNTHESIS	PHILOSOPHICA	
60	(2/2015)	pp.	(189–202)
R.	Bassi,	The	New	Science	of	Virtues195
While	Bergin	and	Fisch	translate	orgoglioso	as	“arrogant”,	the	Italian	has	the	
less	obviously	negative	connotation	of	“proud”;	and	the	twin	notions	of	or-
goglio	and	superbia	prove	fundamental	in	Vico’s	attempt	to	uncover	the	root	
of	heroic	virtue.
This	original,	not	yet	moral	virtue	of	pride	–	almost	instead	a	vice	–	is	often	
paired	with	another:	fierceness	(fierezza).30	For	Vico	this	word	implies	cruelty	
and	violence;	and	it	seems	likely	that	he	chose	fierezza	because	its	root	high-
lights	a	link	to	fiera	and	therefore	to	the	primeval	bestioni	who	cannot	control	
their	rage.	This	is	not	a	virtue	as	Aristotle	would	have	imagined	it;	and,	yet,	
19
This	 problem	 has	 also	 been	 addressed	 by	
Andrea	Battistini	 in	 his	 commentary,	where	
he	goes	 as	 far	 as	 excluding	 that	Vico	might	
have	 had	A.	M.	 Salvini’s	 translation	 (1723)	
in	mind.
20
See	 Bibliothecae S. Angeli ad Nidum ab 
inclyta Brancatiorum familia constructae, et 
ab aliis deinceps auctae catalogus. In quo 
singuli singularium Artium, et Scientiarum 
Libri, qui in quavis fere lingua exstant, Auc-
torumque cognomina ordine alphabetico re-
censentur,	Abbatem	&	Raymundum,	Naples	
1750,	 pp.	 154–155.	 One	 of	 the	 main	 tools	
for	making	a	more	thorough	survey	was	not	
available	to	me:	consultation	of	Valletta’s	li-
brary	catalogue	is	currently	suspended.	For	a	
general	overview	of	the	problems,	as	well	as	
tools	needed	to	assess	Vico’s	‘library’,	see	R.	
Bassi,	 “Introduzione”,	 in:	 eadem,	Canoni di 
mitologia: materiali per lo studio delle fonti 
vichiane,	 Edizioni	 di	 Storia	 e	 Letteratura,	
Rome	 2005,	 pp.	 11–26.	 For	 an	 annotated	
catalogue	of	 the	 editions	 and	 translations	of	
the	Homeric	poems	up	to	Vico’s	time,	see	M.	
Cesarotti,	“Catalogo	delle	principali	edizioni	
e	versioni	di	Omero”,	in:	idem,	Versione let-
terale dell’Iliade,	 Molini	 e	 Landi,	 Florence	
1809,	pp.	1–33.
21
Homer,	Ilias	seu potius omnia eius quae ex-
tant opera, studio et cura Ob. Giphanii I. 
C. quam emendatissime edita, cum ejusdem 
Scholijs et Indicibus novis, excudebat T. Rihe-
lius,	Argentorati	[1572].	This	octavo	edition,	
although	judged	to	be	inaccurate	both	in	text	
and	 in	 translation	 by	 Isaac	 Casaubon,	 was	
widespread	throughout	Europe	and	was	con-
sidered	exemplary	for	a	long	time.	It	was	also	
present	in	Spinoza’s	library:	the	only	work	by	
Homer	 which	 he	 possessed;	 see	 Catalogus 
van de Bóekerij, Vereeniging	 “Het	Spinoza-
huis”,	Den	Haag	[1914],	n.	117	[38],	p.	28.
22
See	Homer,	Ilias,	[1572],	2,	674,	770	(pp.	93,	
97).	In	all	other	occurrences,	however,	a	dif-
ferent	choice	of	translations	is	presented	(ex-
imius,	 egregius,	 inculpatus).	 Other	 editions,	
for	 instance	Homer’s	 Iliad	 edited	by	 Joshua	
Barnes	in	Cambridge	(1711),	tend	to	translate	
the	epithet	consistently	as	 laudatissimus	and	
eximius.	 See	 also	 H.	 Stephanus,	 Thesaurus 
Graecae Linguae,	 Paris	 1831–1856,	 vol.	 1	
pars	altera,	ad vocem,	pp.	174–175.
23
From	NS25	(§	52),	through	NS30 (p.	253)	and	
to	NS44	(§	667).
24
Vico	quotes	(and	mocks)	J.	C.	Scaliger’s	en-
deavour	to	rectify	this	problem	in	his	Poetics,	
see	A.	Grafton,	 “Introduction”,	 in:	G.	Vico,	
New Science,	 pp.	 XI–XXXIII,	 in	 particular	
about	Vico’s	interpretation	of	Homer	and	the	
role	of	J.	C.	Scaliger	see	pp.	XX–XXIV.
25
See	 S.	 Lowenstam,	 “Iris	 ‘Queenly’	 Mother	
and	 the	 Problem	 of	 the	 Irrational	 Use	 of	
Homeric	 Epithets”,	Pacific Coast Philology	
(1981),	pp.	39–47.
26
A.	Amory	Parry,	Blameless Aegisthus. A Study 
of	Amumon	and other Homeric epithets,	Brill,	
Leiden	1973,	p.	60,	see	also	p.	157.
27
NS30,	 p.	 253:	 “Ecco	 l’Eroe,	 ch’Omero can-
ta a’ Greci popoli in esemplo dell’Eroica 
Virtù!”.
28
See	also	the	facsimile	edition	with	Vico’s	ms.	
notes:	G.	Vico, Principi d’una scienza nuova 
d’intorno alla comune natura delle nazioni,	
ed.	by	F.	Lomonaco	e	F.	Tessitore,	with	a	fore-
word	by	M.	Sanna,	Liguori,	Napoli	2002,	p.	
313.
29
§	 667,	 the	 Bergin-Fisch	 translation	 shifts,	
while	 keeping,	 Vico’s	 emphasis	 on	 the	 no-
tion	of	pride,	which	proves	pivotal,	while	this	
notion	is	obliterated	in	Marsh	translation:	“a	
man	so	arrogant	(…)	the	haughty	laws,	pomp-
ous	ceremonies”.
30
See	§	1097	(“tutti	stupore,	quanto	erano	tutti	
orgoglio,	 e	 fierezza”,	 and	also:	 “i	 primi	 sel-
vaggi	 orgogliosi,	 fierissimi”,	 “posta	 la	 loro	
orgogliosa	e	violenta	natura”).
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how	far	can	this	pride	and	fierceness	go	towards	developing	virtues	like	Ar-
istotelian	magnanimity,	courage	and	righteous	indignation?	Vico	searches	for	
passions/vices	which	flow	into	virtues,	so	when	looking	into	Homer’s	Iliad	
for	Achilles’	 characteristics	 and	 heroic	 virtue,	 he	 tries	 to	 trace	 the	 not	 yet	
moral	root	of	the	Aristotelian	virtue	of	magnanimity	by	following	the	fil rouge	
of	the	passion	of	anger.31
3. The four cardinal virtues in Hercules: 
  the Platonic-Christian tradition
The	account	of	virtues	(or,	more	appropriately,	vices)	based	on	the	Homeric	
poems	and	the	figure	of	Achilles	is	very	far	from	accounts	of	the	first	virtues	
presented	in	other	passages	of	the	NS,	centered	as	these	are	on	the	figure	of	
Hercules.	This	demigod	highlights	a	different	set	of	virtues,	belonging	to	a	
different	stage	of	history,	possibly	one	preceeding	the	stage	we	have	just	con-
sidered,	although	admittedly	their	relationship	is	not	always	clear:
“the	fathers	of	the	first	gentes	were	the	first	strong	men	of	history.	Hence	the	founders	of	the	
first	gentile	nations	above	mentioned	were	the	Herculeses	(…)	thus	the	first	fathers	of	the	gen-
tile	nations	–	who	were	(1)	just	in	virtue	of	the	supposed	piety	of	observing	the	auspices	which	
they	believed	divine	commands	of	Jove	(from	whose	Latin	name	Ious	came	(…)	so	that	justice	
among	all	peoples	is	naturally	thought	along	with	piety);	(2)	prudent	in	sacrificing	to	obtain	or	
clearly	to	understand	the	auspices,	and	thus	to	take	good	counsel	of	what,	by	the	commands	of	
Jove,	they	should	undertake	in	life;	and	(3)	temperate	in	the	institution	of	matrimony	–	were	
also,	as	is	here	indicated,	(4)	strong	men.	Hence	new	principles	are	given	to	moral	philosophy	
(…)	by	these	principles	all	the	virtues	have	their	roots	in	piety	and	religion,	by	which	alone	the	
virtues	are	made	effective	in	action,	and	by	reason	of	which	men	propose	to	themselves	as	good	
whatever	God	wills.”	(§	14)
This	 long,	 rambling	 passage	 needs	 to	 be	 stripped	 of	 its	many	 subordinate	
clauses,	so	that	we	can	appreciate	that	Vico	here	isolates	a	set	of	virtues	and	
ties	them	strongly	to	religion.	It	is	easy	to	see	in	this	instance	the	influence	of	
the	four	cardinal	virtues	of	the	Christian	tradition	(fortitude,	justice,	prudence	
and	temperance),	which,	though	mediated	by	the	Stoic	tradition,	originated	in	
Plato’s	Republic	(427e–434a;	441c–444a),	where	the	virtues	of	the	polis	are	
discussed.
Placed	at	 the	very	beginning	of	NS44	 in	 the	opening	section	entitled	“Idea	
of	the	work”,	this	passage	is	the	first	account	of	the	virtues	the	reader	comes	
across,	and	it	sounds	like	an	explicit	declaration	of	faith	and	Christian	ortho-
doxy32.	This	is	one	of	the	very	few	passages	where	the	Platonic	tradition	is	
presented	in	a	pure	form.	More	often,	spurious	elements	are	intermixed,	as	we	
see	in	another	highly	relevant	section,	the	“conclusion	of	the	work”:
“They	developed	commonwealths	on	the	basis	of	orders	naturally	superior	by	reason	of	virtues	
certainly	heroic.	First,	piety,	for	they	adored	divinity,	(…)	and	in	virtue	of	their	piety	they	were	
also	endowed	with	prudence,	taking	counsel	from	the	auspices	of	the	gods;	with	temperance,	
each	coupling	chastely	with	the	one	woman	whom	he	had	taken	under	the	divine	auspices	as	
perpetual	companion	for	life;	with	strength	for	slaying	beasts	and	taming	the	earth;	and	with	
magnanimity	in	giving	succour	to	the	weak	and	aid	to	those	in	danger.	Such	was	the	nature	of	
the	Herculean	 commonwealths,	 in	which	 the	 pious,	wise,	 chaste,	 strong,	 and	magnanimous	
cast	down	the	proud	and	defended	the	weak,	which	is	the	mark	of	excellence	in	civil	govern-
ments”.33
Here	the	Aristotelian	virtue	of	magnanimity	is	inserted	into	the	four	pillars	of	
the	Platonic	system	of	virtues;	and	justice,	if	it	is	to	be	found,	comes	under	the	
category	of	magnanimity,	which	is	defined	as	“casting	down	the	proud	and	
defending	the	weak”.
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Just	a	few	lines	above,	describing	a	previous	stage	of	community	life,	Vico	
adopts	an	even	simpler	tripartite	division	of	virtue	into	piety,	temperance	and	
fortitude:	“these	fathers,	in	the	state	we	must	call	of	nature	(which	was	identi-
cal	with	the	state	of	the	families),	must	have	formed	the	first	natural	orders,	as	
being	those	who	were	pious,	chaste	and	strong.”	(§	1098).	These	virtues	are	
conducive	to	civil	 institutions:	marriage	(temperance);	private	property	and	
control	of	 the	boundaries	of	cultivated	areas	(fortitude:	“in	order	 to	defend	
themselves	and	 their	 families	 they	had	 to	kill	 the	wild	beasts	 that	attacked	
them”);	and	the	particular	form	of	piety	which	suspends	nomadic	life,	so	that	
“in	order	to	provide	sustenance	for	themselves	and	their	families	(…)	they	had	
to	tame	the	earth	and	sow	grain”.	Similarly,	at	§§11–13,	Vico	had	referred	to	
marriages,	burials	(linked	to	control	of	the	boundaries	of	cultivated	areas)	and	
altars	as	ostensible	signs	of	virtues	such	as	temperance,	piety	and	justice.
4. Aristotle and magnanimity
In	Axiom	LXVIII	the	course	of	ideal	eternal	history	is	reworked	by	means	of	
a	personification	of	the	virtues:
“In	the	human	race	first	appear	the	huge	and	grotesque	(immani e goffi),	like	the	cyclopes	(Polif-
emi);	then	the	proud	and	magnanimous,	like	Achilles;	then	the	valorous	and	just,	like	Aristides	
and	Scipio	Africanus;	nearer	to	us,	imposing	figures	with	great	semblances	of	virtues	accompa-
nied	by	great	vices (appariscenti con grand’immagini di virtù che s’accompagnano con grandi 
vizi),	who	among	the	vulgar	win	a	name	for	true	glory,	like	Alexander	and	Caesar;	still	later,	
the	melancholy	and	reflective	(tristi riflessivi),	like	Tiberius;	finally	the	dissolute	and	shameless	
madmen	(furiosi dissoluti e sfacciati),	like	Caligula,	Nero	and	Domitian.”	(§	243).
Here,	Vico	adopts	the	rhetorical	devices	of	climax,	anticlimax,	and	antonoma-
sia	in	order	to	express	his	own	anthropological	view,	rooted	in	the	Aristotelian	
theory	of	virtue.	He	reworks	it	so	as	to	deduce	both	a	series	of	historical	steps	
in	the	evolution	of	morality	and	a	moral	lexicon	which	he	obviously	finds	val-
uable.	The	adjectives	used	by	Vico	in	this	passage	(immani,	magnanimi,	val-
orosi,	giusti,	furiosi,	dissoluti,	sfacciati)	are	revealing	of	the	correlate	virtues	
and	come	loaded	with	a	moral	reflexion	that	had	been	working	on	them	for	
centuries,	at	the	time	Vico	was	writing.	Such	lists	of	adjectives,34	which	are	
found	in	many	passages	of	the	NS,	are	only	apparently	repetitive,	and	should	
be	carefully	considered	as	they	serve	the	purpose	of	building	up	a	theory	of	
the	evolution	of	virtues	(and	vices)	throughout	the	course	of	history.
In	Vico’s	work,	the	Aristotle	of	the	Rhetoric	and	the	Poetics	has	the	same	au-
thority	as	Aristotle	of	the	ethical	works	(and	at	times,	apparently,	even	more).	
An	 instance	 of	 this	 is	 evident	when	we	 consider	Vico’s	 reference	 to	 great	
leaders	of	the	past	such	as	Alexander	the	Great	and	Caesar.	Aristotle	in	the	
31
See	Aristotle,	Rhetoric,	II.	2.
32
For	an	account	of	how	pagan	virtues	had	been	
harmonized	with	Christian	 ideals	during	 the	
Renaissance	 period,	 see	 J.	 Kraye,	 “Pagan	
Virtue	 in	 Pursuit	 of	 Christian	 Happiness:	
Renaissance	 Humanists	 and	 the	 Revival	 of	
Classical	Ethics”,	in:	G.	Althoff	ed.,	Zeichen 
– Rituale – Werte. Internationales Kolloquium 
des Sonderforschungsbereichs 496 an der 
Westfälischen Wilhelms-Universität Münster,	
Rhema,	Münster	2004,	pp.	55–68.
33
NS44,	§	1099.	See	also	§	516	and	553.
34
See	also	§	708	(where	the	heroic	customs	are	
qualified	as	“boorish,	crude,	harsh,	wild,	proud,	
difficult,	obstinate;	bluff,	touchy,	magnanimous	
and	 generous”)	 and	 §	 1101	 (“gl’industriosi	
non	gl’infingardi,	 i	 parchi	 non	gli	 pròdigi,	 i	
providi	 non	 gli	 scioperati,	 i	magnanimi	 non	
gli	gretti	di	cuore”).
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Poetics	(13,	1453a–1454b)	conceded	that	such	figures	are	excellent	characters	
for	tragedies,	where	it	is	necessary	to	employ	heroes	“that	are	neither	very	good	
nor	very	bad,	but	mixing	great	vices	and	great	virtues”	(§	708).	However,	as	
I	have	tried	to	show,	Vico	does	not	rely	exclusively	on	the	Aristotelian	tradi-
tion,	because	all	 the	while	he	keeps	the	Platonic	legacy	in	the	background,	
with	reference	to	the	four	cardinal	virtues,	later	systematized	by	St	Ambrose.	
Although	the	intertwined	traditions	of	Platonism	and	Aristotelianism	might	
seem	to	form	an	inextricably	tangled	skein	in	Vico’s	work,	one	way	of	evalu-
ating	their	respective	influence	more	carefully	would	be	to	take	into	consid-
eration	the	fact	that	only	the	Aristotelian	theory	can	account	for	a	notion	of	
virtue	which	 is	 socially	 conditioned	and	 susceptible	 to	historical	variation.	
Aristotelian	virtues	are	 the	outcome	of	an	ever-changing	balance	(mesotes)	
between	two	extremes,	and	this	balance	can	only	be	identified	on	the	basis	
of	variable	circumstances.	Even	so,	Vico	does	not	seem	to	adhere	strictly	to	
the	Aristotelian	theory	of	the	virtues,	but	rather	draws	on	the	reinterpretations	
and	debates	which	had	grown	up	around	it,	in	the	form	of	a	wealth	of	trea-
tises	and	compendia,	each	with	its	own	outlook	on	the	virtues.	The	particular	
Aristotelian	 tradition	of	 the	virtues	which	might	be	 at	work	 in	 the	NS	 can	
therefore	be	investigated	by	focusing	specifically	on	the	Neapolitan	context	
and	more	generally	on	the	Italian	one,	along	lines	which	still	need	to	be	more	
thoroughly	examined.35	I	will	deal	here	with	just	a	few	sketchy	examples,	in	
order	to	show	the	multi-faceted	nature	of	this	tradition,	as	well	as	the	ways	it	
could	have	been	directly	accessed	by	Vico.
5. Pontano: immanitas	as	vice	(vs.	humanitas	as	virtue)
At	the	end	of	the	15th	century,	as	well	as	a	treatise	on	the	virtue	of	magnanimity	
(De magnanimitate),	Giovanni	Pontano	wrote	a	work	entitled	De immanitate.36	
The	 term	 immanitas	 indicated	 the	attitude	of	someone	who	either	denies	 the	
existence	of	God	or	celebrates	the	divinity	by	ceremonies	and	sacrifices	which	
lack	any	trace	of	humanity.37	Pontano’s	interest	in	this	notion	is	not	particularly	
original,	since	most	commentaries	on	the	Aristotelian	ethics	in	that	period,	and	
even	much	later,38	included	a	section	devoted	to	it.	This	philosophical	reflexion	
on	immanitas	must	have	been	known	to	Vico,	who	employs	this	concept	in	an	
extremely	precise	sense	and	in	a	carefully	chosen	context;	and	his	use	is	consist-
ent	with	Pontano’s	definition.	Interestingly,	that	definition	is	two-fold,	a	duality	
which	will	be	given	new	meaning	by	Vico’s	reinterpretation,	as	we	shall	see.
The	notion	of	 immanitas	 is	at	 the	root	of	the	image	of	the	“beastly	man”.39	
Therefore,	although	it	implies	“inhuman”	in	the	sense	of	cruel	and	can	even	
mean	“inhumane”,	a	very	specific	connotation	links	this	notion	to	a	lack	of	reli-
gion	or	to	inappropriate	religious	ritual.	Inspired	by	a	hint	in	the	Nicomachean 
Ethics	(VII,	6,	1148	b	20),	where	it	is	opposed	to	the	heroic	virtue,	commenta-
tors	had	developed	its	scope	and	implications,	using	immanitas	to	show	that,	
by	contrast,	humanitas	was	a	virtue,	rather	than	a	state	which	could	be	taken	
for	granted.	Keeping	 in	mind	Pontano’s	 treatise,	 therefore,	 it	becomes	very	
easy	to	see	why	Vico	identifies	humanity	with	piety.	Humanity	is	first	of	all	a	
virtue	and	had	already	been	considered	as	such	by	Cicero	and	in	the	classical	
tradition.	As	a	virtue,	it	could	be	interpreted	in	an	Aristotelian	framework	as	a	
disposition	requiring	cultivation	and	constant	exercise	in	what	would	become	
a	“Practic”	of	humanity,	based	on	the	recognition	of	the	divinity	and	demon-
strated	by	appropriate	cults	of	veneration.	Vico,	however,	can	detect	a	continu-
ity	and	a	gradual	progression,	which,	while	distinguishing	humanitas	as	virtue	
from	immanitas	as	vice,	nevertheless	links	them	together	in	that	one	is	the	root	
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and	occasion	for	 the	emergence	of	 the	other.	There	 is	no	mutual	exclusion;	
they	both	stand	in	a	kind	of	tension,	which	constantly	underlies	the	practice	
of	humanity,	understood	as	a	virtue.	But	this	potential,	on-going	threat	affects	
humanity,	understood	as	a	condition	of	being	(opposed	to	that	of	beasts),	and	
makes	the	state	of	humankind	dependent	on	the	virtue	of	humanity.
Just	as	the	first	religious	sentiment	is	born	out	of	veneration	for	false	gods,	
whose	 cult	 is	 a	 form	 of	 superstition,	 so,	 too,	 the	 first	 virtues	 arise	 from	 a	
modification	of	original	vices.	This	is	where	the	“heterogony	of	ends”	comes	
in;	but	Vico	would	not	say	that	virtues	stem	directly	from	vices.	Instead,	those	
high-powered,	original	vices,	destined	to	determine	the	entire	course	of	his-
tory,	 are	 called	 from	 the	 very	 beginning	 “virtues	 of	 the	 senses”	 (virtù per 
sensi),	that	is,	they	are	not	and	cannot	be	the	result	of	reason,	reflection	and	
philosophy:	“in	conclusion,	the	virtues	of	that	first	time	were	like	those	(…)	
admired	by	 the	Scythians,	who	would	 fix	 a	knife	 in	 the	ground	and	adore	
it	 as	 a	god,	 and	 thus	 justify	 their	 killings;	 that	 is,	 they	were	virtues	of	 the	
senses,	with	an	admixture	of	religion	and	cruelty	(mescolate di religione ed 
immanità)”	(§	516).	The	tension	between	bestioni	and	humankind,	which	is	
at	the	basis	of	NS,	is	shaped	inside	a	framework	which	owes	much	to	the	Ar-
istotelian	tradition	of	virtue	ethics:	when	humankind	is	conceived	in	terms	of	
an	Aristotelian	exercise	of	virtue,	centered	on	a	golden	mean,	it	follows	that	
it	must	guard	itself	on	two	fronts:	immanitas	as	superstition,	like	that	of	the	
Scythians,	on	the	one	hand,	and	immanitas	as	atheism,	like	that	of	Polybius	
and	Bayle,	on	the	other.	The	double	meaning	in	Pontano’s	definition	is	able	to	
accommodate	both	these	polemical	targets	of	Vico.
6. Tesauro
The	expression	“genealogy	of	virtues”,	used	throughout	this	paper,	is	not	em-
ployed	by	Vico,	although	it	might	well	have	been.	It	appears	in	Emanuele	Te-
sauro	(1592–1675)	as	the	title	of	a	section	of	his	work,	La filosofia morale deri-
vata dall’alto fonte del grande Aristotele Stagirita.	This	treatise,	reprinted	in	
Venice	in	1703,	in	1712	and	again	in	1729,	was	first	published	in	1670,	and	its	
reprints	testify	to	the	great	interest	in	it	during	the	first	half	of	the	18th	century.	
It	 is	a	weighty	700-page	tome,	generally	regarded	as	an	unoriginal	compen-
dium,	which	has	not	received	much	attention	from	scholars	compared	to	other	
works	by	Tesauro	such	as	his	Cannocchiale aristotelico.	In	the	field	of	rhetoric,	
Vico	has	been	read	in	light	of	Tesauro’s	Cannocchiale aristotelico,	and	it	seems	
unlikely	that	he	would	have	neglected	a	commentary	on	Aristotle’s	moral	philo-
sophy	by	the	same	author,	especially	given	its	popularity	in	his	own	days.
In	Tesauro’s	work,	there	emerges	an	awareness	that	virtues	translate	into	civil,	
social,	 and	 political	 institutions,	which	 seems	 to	 imply	 a	 historical	 reading	
of	moral	virtues.	 In	Axiom	VII,	Vico	combines	 this	notion	with	 that	of	 the	
35
Several	 years	 ago	 this	was	 advocated	 by	E.	
Nuzzo,	Tra religione e prudenza: la “filoso-
fia pratica” di Giambattista Vico,	Edizioni	di	
Storia	e	Letteratura,	Rome	2007,	p.	54,	n.	24.
36
I.	 I.	Pontani,	De Immanitate liber,	ed.	by	L.	
Monti	Sabia,	Loffredo,	Naples	1970.
37
Ivi,	III,	pp.	9–10.
38
See,	for	instance,	M.	S.	Evenius,	Doctrina de 
moribus universa,	Wittemberg	 1612,	Dispu-
tatio	 XVI,	De virtute heroica,	 Theorema	V	
“Extremum Heroicae Virtutis est Feritas seu 
Immanitas quovis vitio deterior”.
39
See	C.	Finzi,	“Giovanni	Pontano,	politica	e	cul-
tura	 in	Napoli	 aragonese”,	Anales de la Fun-
dación Francisco Elías de Tejada	 (1998),	pp.	
161–188,	where	he	refers	to	uomo imbestiato.
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heterogony	 of	 ends,	 drawing	a	picture	of	vices	 and	virtues	 as	 interconnect-
ed:	“Legislation	considers	man	as	he	is	in	order	to	turn	him	to	good	uses	in	
human	society.	Out	of	ferocity,	avarice,	and	ambition,	the	three	vices	which	
run	throughout	the	human	race,	 it	creates	the	military	(la milizia),	merchant	
(la mercatanzia),	and	governing	classes	 (la corte),	and	 thus	 the	strength	 (la 
fortezza),	 riches	 (l’opulenza),	 and	wisdom	of	commonwealths.	Out	of	 these	
three	great	vices,	which	could	certainly	destroy	all	mankind	on	the	face	of	the	
earth,	it	makes	civil	happiness”	(§	132).	Tesauro	had	addressed	the	virtue	at	the	
root	of	the	institution	of	mercatanzia	in	his	commentary.40	Vico,	however,	goes	
beyond	that	and	treats	it	as	an	instance	where	the	heterogony	of	ends	helps	to	
explain	how	vices	and	passions	can	be	turned	into	virtues:
“This	axiom	proves	that	there	is	divine	providence	and	further	that	it	is	a	divine	legislative	mind.	
For	out	of	the	passions	of	men	each	bent	on	his	private	advantage,	for	the	sake	of	which	they	
would	live	like	wild	beasts	in	the	wilderness,	it	has	made	the	civil	institutions	by	which	they	
may	live	in	human	society”	(§	133).
Many	more	parallels	between	Vico	and	Tesauro	can	be	 identified	and	merit	
closer	analysis:	not	only	the	standard	reference	to	the heroic	virtue41	(and	its	
correlate	bestialità),	but	also	the	discussion	of	the	massiveness	of	pyramids,	
considered	as	a	trait	typical	of	barbarism	and	the	opposite	of	magnificence.42	
Vico	develops	this	hint	as	an	instance	of	boria dei dotti43	and	uses	it	to	dismiss	
Atanasius	Kircher,	who	 had	 exalted	Egyptian	 culture	 as	 an	 example	 of	 the	
wisdom	of	the	ancients.
7. Conclusion
Some	important	references	which	might	help	us	to	gain	a	better	understanding	
of	this	problem	have	been	left	out	of	this	preliminary	investigation:	Paolo	Mat-
tia	Doria’s	notion	of	civil-life	virtues,	Mandeville’s	convergence	of	vices	into	
virtues,	Bayle’s	notion	of	virtuous	atheism,	the	Renaissance	legacy	of	pairing	
virtue	and	fortuna,	the	hints	in	Francis	Bacon	and	Spinoza	at	a	“semblance	of	
virtue”,	which	has	a	close	affinity	to	Vico’s	own	notion.	For	this	reason,	these	
can	only	be	partial	conclusions.	The	Aristotelian	framework,	correlating	every	
virtue	with	a	defect	and	an	excess,	both	understood	as	vices,	seems	to	shape	
important	elements	in	the	NS.	Even	the	work’s	conclusion,	presenting	a	sketch	
of	the	barbarism	of	reflection,	seems	to	bear	traces	of	this	structure:
“For	such	peoples,	like	so	many	beasts,	(…)	lived	like	wild	beasts	in	a	deep	solitude	of	spirit	and	
will	(…)	through	long	centuries	of	barbarism,	rust	will	consume	the	misbegotten	subtelties	of	
malicious	wits	(ingegni maliziosi)	that	have	turned	them	into	beasts	made	more	inhuman	(fiere 
più immani)	by	the	barbarism	of	reflection	that	the	first	men	had	been	made	by	the	barbarism	of	
sense.	For	the	latter	display	a	generous	savagery	(fierezza generosa)	(…)	but	the	former,	with	a	
base	savagery	(fierezza vile),	under	soft	words	and	embraces,	plots	against	the	life	and	fortune	
of	friends	and	intimates”	(§	1106).
A	detailed	 list	 of	 the	 vices	which	 condemn	peoples	 to	 the	 courses	 and	 re-
courses	of	history	introduced	this	passage,	and	one	might	wonder	how,	and	
whether,	these	vices	would	differ	from	those	typical	of	the	first	age,	as	here,	
too,	people	are	“slaves	of	 their	unrestrained	passions”	 (§	1105).	Such	pas-
sions,	however,	are	described	as	those	of	“luxury,	effeminacy,	avarice,	envy,	
pride	and	vanity”;	and	although	it	is	specified	that	“in	pursuit	of	the	pleasures	
of	their	dissolute	life	<they>	were	falling	back	into	all	the	vices	characteristic	
of	the	most	abject	slaves”,	these	vices	differ	from	those	of	the	first	age	be-
cause	they	are	based	on	duplicity	and	falsehood,	causing	humans	to	“become	
liars,	tricksters,	calumniators,	thieves,	cowards	and	pretenders”	(§	1105).	Du-
plicity	appears	to	mark	the	excesses	of	“vices	of	reason”	(Vico	might	have	
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remembered	Aristotle’s	notion	of	irony	as	a	vice),	as	opposed	to	the	“vices	of	
senses”,	which	are,	in	Vico’s	eyes,	virtù per sensi,	that	is,	expressing	truths,	
even	when	rooted	in	false	beliefs.
While	early	humanity	tends	to	be	moved	by	vices	rooted	in	an	excess	of	pas-
sions	(fierezza generosa),	and	the	descent	into	barbarism	brings	about	behav-
iours	based	on	vices	which	have	traits	in	common	with	the	first	age	of	bar-
barism	(such	as	immanitas/fierezza),	in	the	later	stage	of	declining	humanity,	
the	general	inclination	tends	to	be	towards	defective	vices	(fierezza vile)	and	a	
lack	of	passions,	coupled	with	an	excess	of	calculating	dissimulation.	The	an-
thropological	scheme	which	places	the	age	of	reason	after	the	age	of	sense	is	
made	more	complex,	and	not	always	entirely	consistent,	because	it	intersects	
with	the	Aristotelian	framework	which	maintains	that	the	virtue	of	humanity	
is	the	mean	between	two	different	sorts	of	vice,	both	limiting	and	counteract-
ing	humanity,	either	by	an	excess	of	passions	and	sense	(and,	what	amounts	
to	the	same	thing,	by	defective	reasoning),	or	by	an	excess	of	reflection	(and	
defective	common	sense).	The	universal	character	of	Tiberius,	described	as	
“melancholy	 reflective”	 (though	Vico	more	 appropriately	 refers	 instead	 to	
sadness,	tristezza),	stands	at	a	turning	point	where	reflection	in	excess	starts	
to	become	a	tainted,	vicious	practice,	at	first	just	subtlely	and	inadvertently.	
We	would	search	the	NS	 in	vain	for	 the	happiness	which	motivates	Aristo-
telian	ethics;	instead	we	find	this	hint	at	sadness	which	signals	a	precocious	
isolation,	a	self-seclusion	and	a	mind	closed	to	the	disposition	of	humanity,	
understood	as	the	virtue	of	partaking	in	the	common	nature	of	nations.	Upon	
the	Aristotelian	structure	of	vices	as	an	excess,	on	the	one	hand,	and	a	defect,	
on	 the	other,	with	virtues	grounded	 in	a	golden	mean,	Vico	can	unfold	 the	
three	movements	 of	 ideal	 eternal	 history.	Although	 he	 is	 familiar	with	 the	
invocation	to	tread	the	via media,44	advanced	by	one	of	his	“four	authors”,	
after	having	written	and	subsequently	discarded	his	Practic of New Science,	
it	looks	like	he	can	no	longer	harbour	the	belief	that	such	a	virtuous	route	is	
actually	able	to	provide	a	sheltered	dimension	for	humankind	to	live	in.
Romana Bassi
Nova znanost vrlinâ
Sažetak
Iako je Vicova Nova	znanost	(NZ) bila interpretirana sa stajališta praktičke filozofije, njegovo 
razmatranje moralnih vrlina većinom je bilo zanemareno. U radu ću ukazati na ključnu ulogu 
koju vrline imaju u NZ, gdje je povijest čovječanstva prikazana kao priča o tome kako se razvija­
ju mane i vrline, a domena slobodne volje je usmjerena na mogućnost stvaranja vrlina strasti. 
Ovo baca novo svjetlo na pojmove poput »heterogonije svrha«, veze između »bestionija« i čo-
40
E.	 Tesauro,	 La filosofia morale derivata 
dall’alto fonte del grande Aristotele Stagirita,	
Pezzana,	Venice	1729,	p.	163.
41
Ibid.,	pp.	579–586.
42
Ibid.,	p.	184:	“Magnifica	fu	veramente	la	mole 
di Artemisia	…	ma	se	si	considera	il	fine	…	
quella	certamente	non	fu	vera	magnificenza,	
ma	insana	oltradecenza;	che	diede	l’esempio,	
e	 il	 nome	 ad	 altre	 simili	 insanie.	 L’istesso	
dirai	delle	barbare piramidi	dell’Egitto	…	e	
principalmente	 di	 quella	 del	Re	Cleope,	 più	
smisurata	di	tutte,	e	più	vergognosa.”
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See	G.	Cacciatore,	“Le	‘borie’	di	Vico	tra	eti-
ca	e	filosofia	della	storia”,	Rivista di filosofia	
(2011),	pp.	363–380.
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See	F.	Bacon,	De sapientia veterum,	XXVII:	
“Scylla,	et	Icarus,	sive	Via	Media”.
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vječanstva, te prijetnje »barbarizma refleksije«. To nam također omogućuje da se fokusiramo 
na fiktivne, mitološke i povijesne ličnosti, koje su primjer njihovih vrlina/mana i koje nude uvid 
u način na koji vrline oblikuju stadije povijesti. Nakon prikaza nekih Vicovih izvora, nastojat ću 
pokazati da Vico vodi blizak dijalog s aristotelovskom tradicijom te interpretira moralne vrline 
kao historijski okvir i hermeneutičko oruđe prikladno za procjenu moralnih stadija ljudske po-
vijesne evolucije na putu prema i od civilizacije.
Ključne	riječi
Giambattista	Vico,	Nova znanost,	moralne	vrline,	mane,	strasti,	aristotelovska	tradicija,	povijest,	čo-
vječanstvo
Romana Bassi
Neue Wissenschaft der Tugenden
Zusammenfassung
Obgleich Vicos Neue	Wissenschaft (NW) vom Blickwinkel der praktischen Philosophie her 
interpretiert wurde, wurde seine Behandlung moralischer Tugenden weitgehend übersehen. 
Ich verweise auf die zentrale Rolle, die Tugenden in der NW spielen, wo die Geschichte der 
Menschheit als Geschichte darüber dargestellt wurde, wie Laster und Tugenden sich entfalten, 
und die Domäne des freien Willens auf die Möglichkeit der Bildung von Tugenden der Leiden-
schaften konzentriert ist. Dies bringt neues Licht in die Begriffe wie „Heterogonie der Zwecke“, 
Verbindung zwischen den „bestioni“ und der Menschheit sowie Drohung der „Barbarei der 
Reflexion“. Dies ermöglicht uns ebenso, sich auf fiktive, mythologische und historische Persön-
lichkeiten zu fokussieren, die als Beispiel für deren Tugenden/Laster dienen und den Einblick 
in die Art und Weise bieten, wie Tugenden Geschichtsstadien formen. Nach der Schilderung ei-
niger Quellen Vicos trachte ich zu zeigen, Vico führe einen engen Dialog mit der aristotelischen 
Tradition und interpretiere die moralischen Tugenden als einen historischen Rahmen und ein 
hermeneutisches Werkzeug, das sich gut eignet für die Einschätzung moralischer Stadien der 
menschlichen geschichtlichen Evolution auf dem Weg zur und von der Zivilisation.
Schlüsselwörter
Giambattista	Vico,	Neue Wissenschaft,	moralische	Tugenden,	Laster,	Leidenschaften,	aristotelische	
Tradition,	Geschichte,	Menschheit
Romana Bassi
La science nouvelle des vertus
Résumé
Bien que La	science	nouvelle (SN) de Vico ait été interprétée du point de vue de la philosophie 
pratique, l’étude des valeurs morales a été largement négligée. Dans ce travail, je mets en 
évidence le rôle clé des valeurs dans la SN, oeuvre dans laquelle l’histoire de l’humanité est 
présentée comme le récit de la formation des vices et des vertus et où le domaine de la volonté 
libre est centré sur la possibilité de créer des vertus à partir des passions. Cela met en lumière 
des concepts tels que « hétérogonie des fins », le rapport entre le « bestioni » et l’humanité et les 
dangers du « barbarisme de la réflexion ». Cela nous permet également de nous concentrer sur 
les figures fictives, mythologiques, et historiques qui représentent de manière exemplaire leurs 
vertus/vices et qui nous offrent un aperçu sur la manière dont les vertus forment les stades de 
l’histoire. Après avoir présenté une vue d’ensemble de certaines des sources de Vico, je soutiens 
qu’il engage un dialogue étroit avec la tradition aristotélicienne. Je tente également de montrer 
qu’il interprète les vertus morales comme cadre historique et arme herméneutique propices à 
évaluer les stades moraux de l’histoire de l’évolution de l’humanité sur le chemin de la civilisa-
tion, aussi bien que partant d’elle.
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